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CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW AND THE
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY:
COMPARING LAW AND PRACTICE
GREGORY M. STEIN*
ABSTRACT
China did not adopt a modern Property Rights Law until 2007,
which means that most modern real estate development occurred
before there was a comprehensive property law to govern it.
Moreover, business conventions in China frequently diverge from
published laws, and the rules that professionals follow do not
always comply with legal requirements. This article addresses how
real estate professionals in China contend with these legal
inconsistencies and uncertainties. It also asks whether China is
disproving the traditional law and development model, which holds
that transparent property and contract laws are a prerequisite to
robust economic development.
Part II introduces some of the common Western misconceptions
about Chinese real estate law and business. Part III presents
examples of how three specific Chinese business practices have
come to differ in significant ways from Chinese real estate law. Part
IV concludes by noting the ways in which China calls into question
the widely accepted model of law and development.
I.
II.
III.
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I. INTRODUCTION

China’s real estate law is inherently paradoxical, as the nation
strives to develop a modern economic and legal system against a
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backdrop of socialist doctrine. The nation actively encourages
private investment and seeks integration into the world economic
system but also remains officially wedded to Communist principles.
For the past quarter century, China has mostly succeeded in
walking this tightrope. Economic development during these years
has been astonishing, particularly in the real estate sector, as China
has raced to compensate for prior decades of little or no growth. At
the same time, the Communist Party continues to maintain strict
control over most aspects of economic and legal life. As a result,
China’s real estate market displays many of the contradictions
referred to as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
China did not adopt its first modern Property Rights Law until
2007. This means that much of China’s recent real estate
development occurred before there was a comprehensive property
law to govern it. Though other areas of business law filled some of
the gaps, Chinese real estate professionals were operating during
this time with only a limited grasp of what would happen if
problems arose later. Many areas of ambiguity and uncertainty
remain even after the adoption of the new Property Rights Law.
This legal fuzziness does not seem to have impeded real estate
investment in China either before or after 2007, and real estate
professionals continue to make important decisions in a legally
unclear environment.
For many years, real estate professionals have fashioned their
business arrangements within this evolving legal landscape. In
some cases, they relied on private contracts of questionable validity
to address uncertainties in the law. As the law later developed, it
either endorsed or contradicted these existing contracts. New rules
sometimes were inconsistent with business practices that had
emerged and become established before the laws were clarified. In
other words, published Chinese real estate laws sometimes conflict
with practices that have arisen in the Chinese real estate industry.
This article addresses how real estate professionals in China
contend with these legal inconsistencies and uncertainties. I have
interviewed dozens of real estate professionals in China during the
past decade, learning how they operate when the legal environment
is unclear and how they respond when legal rules contradict
prevalent business practices. It turns out that business conventions
in China frequently diverge from published laws, and the rules that
professionals follow do not always comply with legal requirements.
Government officials commonly ignore these discrepancies, either
because they benefit personally from the status quo or because they
do not wish to disrupt successful experiments, however questionable
their legality. This article continues by asking whether China is
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disproving the traditional law and development model, which holds
that transparent property and contract laws are a prerequisite to
robust economic development.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces some of the
common Western misconceptions about Chinese real estate law and
business. Part III presents examples of how three specific Chinese
business practices have come to differ in significant ways from
Chinese real estate law. Part IV concludes by noting the ways in
which China calls into question the widely accepted model of law
and development.
II. WESTERN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CHINESE
REAL ESTATE LAW AND BUSINESS
Westerners who possess only a casual familiarity with the
booming Chinese real estate market probably assume that modern
China has already developed robust property and business laws.
From our Western perspective, we imagine that no one would dare
to commit to projects of the scale of those that China has attracted
without a high level of security about the Chinese legal and business
climates. These observers probably take it as a given that China
must have strong contract and property laws, a well-established
method of securing and perfecting rights in real and personal
property, a predictable bankruptcy law, and a reliable judiciary.
But while China has generally been moving in this direction, it
would be inaccurate to describe Chinese property laws as firmly
established. In fact, China’s Property Rights Law – its first
comprehensive law of real property since the 1949 establishment of
the People’s Republic – did not take effect until 2007, well after the
current real estate boom was underway. The Chinese Constitution
and other substantive laws picked up some of this legal slack, but
many of these related mandates were spotty and generalized, with
little emphasis on property rights. In fact, it is this disjunction
between practice and law, and between Western assumptions and
Eastern realities, that first attracted me to the subject.1
Westerners seeking to learn a new area of the law begin by
looking for published statutes in that subject area.2 Once the
Western lawyer identifies any applicable statutes, she will next look
1. For a more detailed discussion of these Western misconceptions, see GREGORY M.
STEIN, MODERN CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW: PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING LEGAL
SYSTEM 19-23 (2012).
2. To be fair, American lawyers seeking to understand real estate law may not actually
begin in this way, since American property law tends to be common law rather than statutory,
and the few statutes do little more than codify common law principles that have developed
over the centuries. Thus, an American lawyer seeking to understand a topic within real
property law may justifiably proceed directly to the cases.
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for cases decided under these statutes, which may interpret
imprecise terms and shed light on ambiguities in the statutes. After
she has developed a clearer understanding of what the statute says
and what the case law holds, she will then examine actual business
practices, with the assumption that these practices have evolved to
reflect what the law allows and prohibits. This is how Western
lawyers are trained and how Western law professors train our
students.
This approach does not work terribly well for the Westerner who
aims to understand Chinese real estate law. China’s Property
Rights Law is a new law, so it is still maturing and has only begun
to be tested. Case law is far less important in China’s civil law
system than it is under the common law. Conversely, personal
relationships are far more significant and influential in China than
in Western legal systems; in fact, these personal relationships
(guanxi) form a critical component of social networking in China.3
If a Westerner seeks to learn Chinese real estate law from a
Chinese expert, she will discover that there are few such experts, at
least in academia. China’s law schools reopened only in the 1980s,
and many schools do not even offer a separate course in property
law. Moreover, those few who have become proficient in this area
are less likely to be teaching real estate law than practicing it, or
perhaps even working in the real estate business. The academic
knowledge base is thin, a fact that is also reflected in the dearth of
articles and treatises on the subject.
China’s emerging and impatient entrepreneurs were disinclined
to wait for China to draft and implement all of the relevant laws.
This means that Chinese business practices in the real estate sector
began to mature before many real estate laws had been adopted and
interpreted. If anything, the legal system has had to struggle to keep
abreast of emerging business approaches, with laws seeming to
respond to business practices rather than the reverse.4
3. See, e.g., Antara Haldar & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Analyzing Legal Formality and
Informality: Lessons from Land Titling and Microfinance Programs, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 123, 132 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds. 2013) (“A more
positive view can see it [guanxi] as playing a crucial role in Chinese economic processes –
providing consistency in transactions that would otherwise be missing in the absence of
formal rules. . . . ”); Rita Yi Man Li & Yi Lut Li, Is There a Positive Relationship Between Law
and Economic Growth? A Paradox in China, 9 ASIAN SOC. SCI. 19, 25 (2013), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290481 (describing guanxi as “a type of human
capital,” “an important asset for both individuals and firms,” and “an alternative reward and
punishment system”). These personal relationships sometimes blossom into the outright
corruption that China is struggling to contain. See infra note 22.
4. This phenomenon is not unique to high-end commercial real estate developers.
Many rural migrants to China’s rapidly growing cities live in informal housing of questionable
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In addition, the public sector is far more important in China
than in most Western nations. This fact surprises some Western
lawyers and business experts, who mistakenly view the current
Chinese system as powerfully capitalist while often viewing
Western government activities as “creeping socialism.” China owns
or controls all of the land within its borders. Government-controlled
or -affiliated businesses hold the right to use much of this land, and
government-controlled banks make many of the lending decisions
that determine in practice whether this land can be improved. In
fact, there is a high degree of coordination between the political and
business sectors in China, and certainly much higher than that seen
in Western economies. In addition, the government has spent huge
amounts of money on infrastructure during the past three decades,
as China struggles to overcome many years of neglect.
The real estate sector is also far more important as a proportion
of China’s economy than is the corresponding sector within Western
economies. China’s stock markets are tiny compared to those in the
United States and many other Western nations. China’s regulatory
oversight of its securities markets is also less advanced, a fact that
scares off many potential investors. Foreign opportunities are
largely unavailable to domestic Chinese investors due to currency
restrictions. Chinese citizens seeking investment avenues have
flocked to real estate due to a lack of attractive alternatives. Real
estate has thus become the default – and perhaps the only – option
for many investors, causing lopsided growth in that sector.5
China’s adherence to the Western conception of rule-of-law
has been spotty, much to the concern of many Western trading
partners.6 The Chinese Communist Party is well aware of Western
concerns about this issue. At the recent Third Plenary Session
of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,
the Central Committee adopted a decision stating, “We should work
harder to accelerate socialist democracy in a systematic way by
legality. The cities need their workers, however, and government officials acquiesce in their
living arrangements. Moreover, other countries also exhibit a disjunction between published
laws and actual practices in this area and others. See, e.g., Jean-Louis van Gelder, Paradoxes
of Urban Housing Informality in the Developing World, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 493, 494 (2013)
(noting the persistence of informal housing arrangements in Latin America); id. at 495
(“governments confronted with illegal land occupation may evict informal occupants, but may
also formalize their tenure and incorporate these settlements into the legal fabric of the city”).
5. See, e.g., Ester Fung, China Stock-Market Investors Pulling Out, Directing Money
Into Property: Survey, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2015, 11:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/china
realtime/2015/07/06/china-stock-market-investors-pulling-out-directing-money-into-property
-survey/?mod=WSJBlog (noting how volatility in China’s stock markets in 2015 have driven
investors out of stock investments and into real estate).
6. See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW
2–21 (2002) (offering alternative definitions of the term “rule of law”).
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adopting due standards and procedures. We should build a socialist
country with the rule of law, and develop people’s democracy with
wider, more adequate and sound participation.”7
In addition, China is a far more communitarian nation than,
say, the United States. China’s constitutional equivalent of the
American Bill of Rights is quite expansive, but is limited by a
provision that expressly subordinates individual freedoms to “the
interests of the State, of society or of the collective.”8 Individual
rights are left unprotected in China in other ways as well. There are
few laws implementing these constitutional guarantees, and the
judiciary is not independent. Moreover, a citizen’s right to sue the
government is limited, and citizens may not invoke the Constitution
in challenging government actions.9 China’s Property Rights Law
appears to be atypical in this regard, in that it does further a
constitutional guarantee.10
Finally, while Western real estate markets – notwithstanding
some huge shocks in recent years – are relatively established, the
only constant in China’s modern real estate market is change.
Western forecasters continue to predict a crash, but China’s real
estate sector is surviving the blows that have struck it so far. Many
of those with an appetite for risk and uncertainty have been able to
profit in Chinese real estate, at least so far. And this process of legal
and business evolution is not over, as the market and the legal
system both continue to mature.
In short, any Westerner who believes on the basis of her own
domestic experience that she knows what China’s future looks like
is grounding that prediction on Western assumptions that probably
do not hold true in a vastly different nation. To the extent that
Westerner has made similar predictions in the past, she has
probably been wrong much of the time, or just lucky.

7. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, Adopted at the Third Plenary
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 12,
2013 (hereinafter, “Third Plenum”), at I.2, http://www.china.org.cn/chinathird_plenary_
session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
8. XIANFA art. 51 (2004) (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/05/
content_1381903.htm.
9. Surya Deva, The Constitution of China: What Purpose Does It (Not) Serve?, 2 JINDAL
GLOBAL L. REV. 55, 71 (2011).
10. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2830205

2015-2016]

CHINESE REAL ESTATE

7

III. SOME EXAMPLES CONTRASTING CHINESE
BUSINESS PRACTICES WITH CHINESE
REAL ESTATE LAW
This part will offer three illustrations in which Chinese business
and legal practice has diverged from official law.11 The first example
addresses the legal requirement that the initial holder of a land use
right develop the underlying land within two years. Article 26 of the
Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate provides, with
some exceptions that are not pertinent here:
Where one year has elapsed from the date for starting the
development as agreed upon in the granting contract and the
land is not yet developed, fees for idle land which is
equivalent to twenty percent or less of the fees for granting
the land-use right shall be collected; where two years have
elapsed and the land is still not developed, the land-use right
may be reclaimed without compensation . . . .12
The intent of this Article seems to be to prevent the extended
holding of undeveloped land.13 Investors who purchase land use
rights with the goal of building promptly are allowed to use the land,
while those who would hold the land are more limited in their
capacity to do so. Without a provision such as Article 26, an initial
purchaser of a land use right might theoretically hold the land
vacant until the land use right expires seventy years later and
might intend to do so from day one.14

11. This divergence between published law and actual practice is not limited to real
estate law, or even to business law more generally. For example, one scholar has documented
how citizens are turning away from formal channels for redress of their administrative
grievances in favor of public protest. Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J.
COMP. L. 935, 962 (2013) (“Disgruntled parties (regardless of the underlying validity of their
complaint) quite logically conclude that staging a coordinated internet protest or launching a
mass petition of hundreds of disgruntled farmers to the provincial capital stands a better
chance of getting what they want rather than actually using legal channels.”).
12. Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, revised Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 30, 2007), art. 26, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/
content_1383755.htm. Note that this translation, while probably the most authoritative, does
not reflect the 2007 amendments to this law. The Article referred to in the text was not
amended in 2007 but was renumbered from Article 25 to Article 26.
13. The understanding of the people I interviewed is that this provision is supposed to
be enforced strictly, despite the use of the more discretionary “may” in the final clause.
14. Although the holder might hold land vacant for that long absent the limitations
contained in Article 26, for practical reasons the holder would probably build far sooner than
that. The holder has paid for the land use right and must also bear certain carrying costs, so
there are considerable economic incentives to build promptly, in addition to the legal incentive
that Article 26 provides.
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Article 26 thus encourages rapid development by potentially
imposing heavy penalties on those who allow urban land to remain
dormant. While one might legitimately question the environmental
and land use planning implications of such a law, it appears to
advance the important goal of speedy construction of housing in a
nation that needs to build tens of millions of urban residential
units. Millions are flocking to China’s cities from the countryside,
even as long-time urban residents seek to replace their outdated
older housing with more modern dwellings. This legal provision
dramatically increases the likelihood that those who acquire urban
residential land use rights will use them quickly: If they buy a
land use right, they must use it within two years or potentially
suffer significant consequences. If they do not intend to use the land
within the next two years, this provision will discourage them from
purchasing the land use right in the first place, which will leave the
land available for someone else who intends to use it promptly. The
same incentives apply to commercial and industrial urban land.
Thus, Article 26 appears to promote a particular type of
stewardship of a limited resource. For better and for worse, Chinese
policy plainly favors rapid real estate development over speculative
investment in raw urban land, and this provision may have been
included to address a perceived buy-and-hold problem that existed
before the law became effective.15 In response to this problem,
Article 26 proclaims, “Use it or you may lose it!”
In numerous interviews with real estate developers and other
professionals, however, I learned that government enforcement of
this provision is flexible, if not a bit erratic. Some holders of land
use rights have been permitted to purchase extensions: they pay an
additional fee and, in exchange, the government agrees that the
right will last for more than the statutory two years even in the
absence of construction by the owner. Others simply ask for
extensions and receive them free of charge.16 Neither of these
options appears to be encouraged by Article 26. But under these

15. Note, though, that the Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate dates back
to 1995, twelve years before the adoption of the Property Rights Law, a time when the current
system of land use rights was just beginning to blossom. So the drafters may actually have
been anticipating a potential problem rather than confronting an existing one.
16. The non-mandatory language of Article 26 (“as agreed upon in the granting
contract”) might allow the government to grant a land use right with a deferred construction
date. Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, revised Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 30, 2007), art. 26. However, local government policy favors rapid real
estate development and generally discourages such delays, and none of my interviewees
suggested that governments were granting these types of built-in deferrals.
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applications of the law, the motto of this Article becomes the more
flexible and less predictable, “You should use it now, but you may
also be able to use it a little later if you prefer and we consent.”
Still other holders of land use rights initiate minimal
construction in an effort to meet the letter of the law, though plainly
not its spirit. Article 26’s requirement that the land be “developed”
within the applicable time period is most plausibly read to mean
fully developed, which suggests that minimal construction does
not meet the requirements of Article 26.17 Thus, a small amount
of construction probably is not enough to preclude imposition of
the statutory penalties and is almost certainly not what the
drafters intended. Nonetheless, my interviewees told me that some
developers had taken this approach successfully.
Some of the parties I interviewed did verify that the government
may insist on strict compliance with Article 26. In at least some of
these cases, the initial holder of the land use right forfeited the right
and did not receive a refund of the purchase price. However, the
law’s strong encouragement of prompt construction appears to be
treated more flexibly in most cases. Prevailing business practices
and government enforcement do not always comport with the
apparent intent of this Article.
There are numerous reasons why a government body might
treat this mandate so flexibly. The government might believe that
flexibility is warranted as a matter of good policy, perhaps because
the retention of vacant land sometimes serves a useful purpose
and ought not to be discouraged quite as strongly as the statutory
language indicates. If government officials view the legislation as
bad policy, they may elect to interpret it in a way that seems wiser
to them. Officials might be doing favors (or worse) for their friends
or might own interests in the projects themselves. They may believe
that it would be unfair to surprise purchasers of land use rights by
beginning to enforce this construction requirement strictly after
years of failing to do so.
In fact, some of the people I interviewed noted that the Shanghai
government has begun to hint that it might soon enforce this
provision more strictly, perhaps providing in practice the warning
that the statute ostensibly delivered already. This might be an
example of the government finally acknowledging what the law has
actually said all along and enforcing it as written. Or it might simply
reflect a desire to cool down a market that some see as having
17. Practically speaking, two years will not always be sufficient time to develop a large
parcel fully, even if the holder of the land use right commences construction promptly and
pursues it diligently. Keep in mind, though, that construction in China frequently proceeds
at a breakneck pace that is unfamiliar to those in the West who interact regularly with
building contractors.
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become too overheated. If this latter view is correct, then the
government has opted to vary the rigor of its enforcement in
response to changing market conditions. Stricter enforcement will
presumably lead holders of land use rights to reduce the extent to
which they warehouse buildable land, thereby reducing demand for
and prices of land use rights and quieting the market.
This more nuanced approach might constitute wise land use
policy, even if it is not authorized by the law itself. The selectiveenforcement tactic many local governments in China have adopted
with respect to Article 26 may represent a flexible response
to constantly changing market conditions. But it seems that
government bodies and purchasers of land use rights have been
following business practices that conflict with the restrictions
contained in the law itself.
A second example of the divergence between practice and law,
somewhat linked to the first example, appears in Article 39 of the
Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate. This provision
places limits on the power of the initial non-governmental holder of
a residential land use right to transfer that right to another. While
land use rights are generally transferable, the initial holder of a
residential right may not re-transfer that right until the initial
holder has completed at least 25 percent of the proposed structure.
Specifically, Article 39 states: “Where the land-use right has been
obtained by means of granting, transfer of the real estate shall meet
the following conditions: . . . (2) Having . . . fulfilled twenty-five
percent or more of the total investment for development in the case
of housing projects . . . .”18
The prohibition set forth in Article 39 appears to serve a purpose
similar to the limitation described in Article 26. While Article 26
encourages the prompt use of scarce urban residential land, Article
39 discourages speculation in vacant land by restraining those who
seek to profit from buying raw land and then selling it rather than
developing it. This latter Article both advances public policy goals
and accords with Communist doctrine. Those investors who will
use land rapidly and productively, thereby benefiting the broader
public as well as themselves, may do so. By contrast, detested land
speculators will be thwarted in their efforts.
Once again, this provision is frequently ignored, or at least
finessed, as several of the Chinese real estate experts I interviewed
18. Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, revised Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 30, 2007), art. 39, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/
12/content_1383755.htm. Note again that this translation, while probably the most
authoritative, does not reflect the 2007 amendments to this law. The article referred to in the
text was not amended in 2007 but was renumbered from Article 38 to Article 39.
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confirmed. To begin with, it is not always easy or desirable to
clarify exactly when a developer has “fulfilled twenty-five percent or
more of the total investment for development,” and developers are
apparently able to persuade government officials that “a good start”
is equal to at least 25 percent. Perhaps there is uncertainty as to
what the denominator of this development fraction is, and real
estate professionals may be able to convince officials that even a
small amount of construction is equal to 25 percent of something.
Or perhaps developers are very persuasive and government officials
are easily persuaded, or merely indifferent.
In addition, initial holders of land use rights to undeveloped land
and the parties who wish to buy these rights from them can readily
avoid the strictures of Article 39 by structuring their land transfers
as stock sales rather than asset sales, which government officials do
not appear to view as “transfers” within the meaning of Article 39.
Thus, a would-be buyer who appears barred by the Article from
buying a current owner’s land use right can instead purchase all of
the shares of the current owner, thereby becoming the indirect
holder of the land use right. There appears to be nothing improper
about behaving in this manner, though the statute might have been
drafted with more precision to prevent – or endorse – this workaround. In fact, it seems unlikely that this provision was adopted
with the recognition that it could be so readily circumvented.19
It is also possible that despite the negative connotations
surrounding speculation in land – connotations that are probably
even more severe in China than in the United States – government
officials charged with enforcing Article 39 recognize the valid
and useful economic purpose that speculators serve. Speculators
reduce price risk for some sellers (including, here, the government)
by committing to a set price immediately and reducing future
uncertainty. In effect, they provide a form of price insurance: The
seller pays an insurance premium now in the form of a possibly
reduced price in exchange for the comfort of knowing that the land
has been sold for a fixed price that will not drop even more in the
future. The seller thereby conveys the risk of price volatility to the
speculator. Speculators take the risk that the land will never prove
to be worth what they paid for it, a price that includes the carrying
costs of the land during the intervening fallow years, and are
rewarded with the possibility that the price they paid will seem
inexpensive in retrospect.

19. American real estate professionals often behave in a similar manner – legally –
whether it is to avoid the imposition of transfer taxes and recording fees or to circumvent
landlord restrictions on assignment and subletting.
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In China, where the initial seller of a land use right is always
a government entity and is usually hungry for cash, waiver of
strict compliance with this Article also allows the government to
accelerate its receipt of the proceeds of the sale of the land use right.
This allows the government to obtain immediately funds it may
need for current government operations, even before developers
are ready to proceed. China might have important historical
and cultural reasons for trying to limit land speculation. But a
prohibition on land speculation is not cost-free, and government
officials that waive strict enforcement of Article 39 seem to
recognize this fact.
The initial buyers of land use rights have their reasons for
wanting to convey these rights before the land is sufficiently built
out, and their would-be transferees have their own reasons for
wanting to buy these rights. Government officials seem to have
decided that they will allow this conduct, or at least look the other
way. The government benefits both by obtaining cash earlier than
it otherwise might and by reducing price risk. The initial purchaser
benefits by obtaining a land use right before it is ready to build. It
locks in its ownership of the right and may receive a lower price.
The subsequent purchaser benefits by acquiring a land use right
when it chooses rather than having to wait for its seller to reach a
certain stage of construction.
The only losers are the opponents of the much-despised activity
of speculation in land. This restriction, presumably adopted for
historical reasons, makes little economic sense and counters the
generalized trend toward freer markets in China. Once again,
actual business practice in China appears to contradict intended
legal restrictions. And here, this incongruity illustrates a case
where the practice probably makes more economic sense than the
legal prohibition does.
My third illustration is somewhat different. This next
illustration is a demonstration of intentional reality distortion
rather than intentional disregard of the law or the law’s intent,
but it bears many similarities to the first two examples. In order
to qualify for a loan, real estate developers must make certain
submissions to potential lenders, just as borrowers have to do in the
West. For example, prospective borrowers are required to submit a
feasibility study that demonstrates the need for the project. Lenders
want to be repaid, and this study is designed to give them comfort
that there is a market for the developer’s product. If the developer
plans to sell the project, as with a residential building, then these
sales will generate the proceeds the developer needs to repay the
lender when the project is completed. If the developer plans instead
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to hold the project for rental income, as with some retail buildings,
then the net cash flow will allow the developer to make monthly loan
repayments. Either way, the lender wants some confirmation that
the project is needed and realistic and that there are enough
potential buyers or tenants out there that the borrower’s proposal
will actually pan out.
Developers do submit feasibility studies to lenders, but, as my
interviewees confirmed, these studies are entirely unrealistic and
overoptimistic. They make projections that are not justified, solely
to persuade the lender to extend a loan that it otherwise would be
reluctant to make. Surprisingly, the lenders know from day one that
these feasibility studies are largely fabricated and make the loans
anyway. Why would a lender that claims to need comfort rely on
reassurances it knows to be false?
It turns out that China’s banks have dual goals, and these goals
often conflict. On the one hand, they are lenders that need to turn a
profit. On the other hand, they are owned or controlled by a
government that may have political goals that conflict with this
profit orientation. When government-controlled lenders approve
loans that they know are unlikely to be repaid, they are probably
favoring political goals over the desire to make money. Stated
differently, they choose to lose money in order to advance particular
important political aims. When they knowingly overlook the fact
that a developer’s feasibility study is unrealistic, they are, in fact,
choosing to lose money for reasons that may be entirely rational.
For example, suppose an old, government-controlled factory
wishes to expand. By expanding, it can continue to provide jobs,
housing, education, health care, and retirement benefits to its
employees and their families. However, the factory is obsolete and
the product it makes could probably be produced more efficiently
and less expensively by a newer, privately owned factory. In short,
this old factory should probably be permitted to die a natural death.
The lender the old factory approaches for funding has two choices:
it can turn down the loan, knowing that the loan is high-risk and
unlikely to be repaid, or it can take the risk anyway and advance
the funds.
A profit-oriented lender would choose the first option. The
factory would not receive its loan and would not be able to expand,
and some of its workers would lose their jobs, their homes, and their
benefits. The government would either have to let these workers
suffer on their own – an unlikely outcome in a nation that seeks to
avoid social unrest – or it would have to step in and make up for
these lost benefits one way or another. Even if the government does
intervene to protect the displaced workers, these workers would
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experience significant displacement during this transition and
might become restless for change. The bank would have made a wise
economic decision, and the government would pay the financial and
political price.
Alternatively, a government-controlled Chinese lender might
elect the second option, extending credit with full awareness that
the borrower is unlikely ever to repay its loan. The factory will be
able to expand, however inefficiently, and the “iron rice bowl” will
survive a bit longer. These workers will continue to enjoy their jobs
and benefits, will not suffer tremendous social displacement, and
are less likely to become restive. Meanwhile, the factory will
probably remain uncompetitive and thus will be unable to repay
the loan. The bank will lose money but will continue to enjoy
government support despite its economically poor decision to make
this loan.
Either way, the government probably ends up paying the costs
of keeping these workers housed, educated, and healthy. In the
first case, it pays these costs directly, transferring money to newly
unemployed workers, educating their children, and providing them
with the health and retirement benefits their former employers
can no longer offer. If this is what happens, the workers may be
dissatisfied, as unemployed workers anywhere would be. In the
second case, the government pays these costs indirectly, in the form
of a disguised jobs program, and the workers may never notice that
their wages and benefits are being subsidized by the taxpayers.
A Western lender, which must answer to individual
shareholders, would prefer the first option. The loan is unlikely to
be repaid, and the political concerns are someone else’s problem. A
government-controlled Chinese lender is more likely to prefer the
second option, which achieves approximately the same ends but
with less upheaval. This lender is not responsive to individual
shareholders who must be satisfied. Rather, its goal is to meet the
political objectives of the government that controls it. The factory
will eventually die, but its workers will have more time to adapt to
this inevitable reality. The pain will be spread out over a longer time
as the workers adjust their expectations more gradually. From the
government’s perspective, this may be the preferable alternative.
The government-affiliated lender, in short, has a greater incentive
than a private lender to internalize the social externalities that the
closing of the business would trigger.
Chinese bank policies also advance these political goals in other
ways. Bank officials in China must meet annual lending quotas, and
their compensation is tied to the amount of money they lend. These
loans need not be wise ones. Rather, the point is to get the funds
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they are holding from China’s many thrifty depositors back into the
economy to support economic development. Thus, the vice president
of a Chinese bank might be rewarded for making a loan that would
get the vice president of an American bank fired. The goals of
the two lenders differ dramatically, and the system of rewarding
employees reflects these significant differences.
The Chinese developer, of course, is far more likely than the
lender to want the project to be economically successful. Granted,
real estate developers in China, like lenders, often enjoy close
government ties. A government entity might be a partner in a
developer. For example, an entrepreneurial private party with real
estate expertise and a government entity that has the power to
decide who receives a desirable land use right might become
partners, with the private party contributing money and know-how
and the government partner contributing the land use right. Thus,
a Chinese developer may be motivated in part by the same political
goals as a lender. However, the Chinese developer is still far more
likely than the Chinese lender to want to turn a profit and far less
likely to care about satisfying some long-time workers in a dying
industry.
For this reason, many real estate developers actually produce
two feasibility studies. The more realistic one is intended for
internal review only. It predicts for the company’s principals
whether the transaction will be profitable and facilitates the
company decision as to whether it will proceed. The less realistic
study is designed for the lender. It provides the lender’s loan review
staff with the cover it needs to approve the loan and goes into the
files in case the lending decision is ever reviewed by regulatory
officials. The lender may know that this second feasibility study
is unrealistic, but that is not the point. Rather, the goal is for
the developer and the lender to appear to have done everything
properly.
In the end, these high-risk loans often will not be repaid. The
lender will lose money, as it foresaw was likely. The loss suffered
by this government-controlled lender will be subsidized by the
government, which is to say by the taxpayers of China. A political
goal that the government deems beneficial will be advanced and will
be paid for by China’s citizens. The fact that these banks served as
a conduit for this money is simply a means of accomplishing a
political end that the government deemed desirable.
This last illustration is not, strictly speaking, an example of
business practices developing that conflict with published laws,
although it is quite likely that the deliberate submission of a
fictitious or misleading feasibility study is legally improper. Rather,
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this is an example of a case in which a large number of people
involved in the decision whether to extend a loan to a real estate
developer knowingly participate in a dog-and-pony show. Instead of
ignoring a law overtly, the developer is giving the appearance of
complying with it.
There is nothing inherently wrong with a government-controlled
lender and a developer that may also be affiliated with the
government working together to accomplish goals that the
government, on behalf of China’s citizens, deems to be worthy.
Given China’s recent history, with its many rocky conflicts between
those who wish to join the international economy more closely and
those who would adhere more strictly to Communist principles, this
may be a workable compromise. The government subsidizes its
workers indirectly while giving the appearance of fostering a market
economy. As long as everyone involved in the system knows how it
works in practice, there is probably little damage done economically
and perhaps much to be gained politically. But no observer should
believe that she is receiving an accurate picture of China’s real
estate market by reviewing feasibility studies that prospective
borrowers submit to lenders. The charade may succeed reasonably
well, but it is still a charade.20
IV. CHINA AND THE LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT MODEL
This part concludes by noting some of the ways China calls the
widely accepted law and development model into question. The
previous part explored several settings in which Chinese real estate
law and Chinese business practice have become disconnected. In
two of these examples, a business practice that developed for
sensible reasons appears to contradict the letter or the spirit of the
law. China seems content to let these divergences persist for the
time being: There are good reasons for the law and other good
reasons for the actual practice, and the inconsistency seems to
create no great harm in the short run. In the third example, all the
parties in a particular sector of the real estate industry pretend that
something is true while knowing it to be false. Once again, this may
make good sense in context.

20. In fact, it is not always clear how to distinguish between privately owned and stateowned enterprises. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership:
State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 688-700 (2015) (suggesting that
the focus should be not on the ownership of the firm, but rather on the extent to which the
industry in question has been captured).
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While these examples, individually, seem relatively minor,
they are all indications that real estate professionals have
grown comfortable ignoring or circumventing official rules. The
government seems to be suggesting that this is acceptable behavior,
or at least appears to be condoning it.21 In at least two of these
instances, government officials evidently do not mind that real
estate professionals are contravening the laws these officials are
charged with enforcing. More broadly, this habit of looking the other
way encourages similar disregard in the future and suggests that
rule-of-law standards are not fully imbedded among Chinese real
estate professionals. It also hints at more widespread government
corruption, a fact of which the Chinese Communist Party is keenly
aware.22
This is not meant to imply that similar violations of the rules are
uncommon in Western jurisdictions.23 However, the frequency of
this type of behavior in China and the large stakes involved in some
of these examples suggest that the problem is far more widespread
in China than in Western nations, where adherence to rule-of-law
standards is more firmly established. It appears that Chinese
professionals, at least in these settings, see less of a need to follow
published laws.
All of this discussion raises the more general question of the
degree to which China follows the traditional law and development
model. That model holds that contract and property law must be
firmly established, predictable, and reliable before investors are
comfortable investing heavily in an economy.24 If those laws are not
well-established and are not well-supported by an independent
judiciary, potential stakeholders will view this legal uncertainty as
21. Chinese entering into real estate transactions may also have a difficult time
shedding their old habits relating to real estate. Two commentators, for example, have
described the “mental inertia” that some condominium owners may experience when first
undertaking condominium self-governance. See Lei Chen & Mark D. Kielsgard, Evolving
Property Rights in China: Patterns and Dynamics of Condominium Governance, 2013
CHINESE J. COMP. L. 1, 16 (“[T]he general popular appeal and vitality of the private ownership
of real property is subject to varying opinions since traditional communal or collective practice
is ingrained in Chinese society, and many unit owners may experience difficulty in
overcoming this mental inertia.”).
22. See, e.g., Third Plenum, supra note 7, at X.36 (“We will strengthen the Party's
unified leadership over the work of improving Party conduct, upholding integrity and fighting
corruption. We will reform the Party's discipline-inspection system, improve the leadership
system and working mechanism to combat corruption, and reform and improve the function
of anti-corruption coordination groups at all levels.”).
23. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own?
Accessory Dwelling Unit Reform and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW. 519, 521 (2013)
(noting that accessory dwelling units are common in residential neighborhoods despite the
fact that many local land use regulations prohibit them).
24. For a more comprehensive exploration of this topic, see STEIN, supra note 1, at 14798.
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an additional speculative risk that detracts from their potential
return, and they will be correspondingly less willing to commit their
funds to acquiring assets that are governed by that legal system.25
This is not to say that investors will be unwilling to invest under
this type of regulatory uncertainty. These participants should,
however, demand higher returns that reflect the increased risk this
legal ambiguity generates. This type of uncertainty functions as a
drag on the economy, with investors demanding a greater return
than they would if the legal risk were lower.26
The law and development model, then, suggests that markets
with firmly established property and contract laws will have
an advantage in the competition for investment dollars.
China, however, has exhibited considerable uncertainty and
unpredictability in these areas of the law while still attracting
huge amounts of capital.27 The question then becomes how to
explain this inconsistency. I have already described elsewhere
several ways in which to account for China’s unexpectedly strong
performance.28 I will summarize that subject here very briefly and
will also discuss the ways in which informal norms seem to have
served as a substitute for formal legal rules in China.
The first explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the
law and development theory is simply wrong. As Frank Upham
notes in his criticism of the theory as applied to China, “For
those interested in the relationship between law and economic
development, . . . it is almost as if those thirty years of growth [1978-

25. See, e.g., Cheryl Xiaoning Long, Does the Rights Hypothesis Apply to China?, 53 J.
L. & ECON. 629, 646-47 (2010) (“[A] higher proportion of business disputes settled through the
court system . . . is correlated with a higher investment rate, a higher propensity to adopt
automated technology, a higher probability of developing new products, and more longdistance sales for Chinese firms.”); Stefan Voigt & Jerg Gutmann, Turning Cheap Talk into
Economic Growth: On the Relationship Between Property Rights and Judicial Independence,
41 J. COMP. ECON. 66, 72 (2013) (concluding that legal promises to protect property rights
have little effect on economic development on their own; rather, these legal promises must be
buttressed by an independent judiciary); see generally Third Plenum, supra note 7, at IX (“We
will deepen reform of the judicial system, accelerate the building of a just, efficient and
authoritative socialist judicial system to safeguard the people’s rights and interests, and
ensure that the people are satisfied with the equality and justice in every court verdict.”).
26. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD 152-58 (1989) (discussing the costs of working around an inadequate legal
system in Peru).
27. The Chinese Communist Party seems to be aware of this potential problem. See
Third Plenum, supra note 7, at II.5 (“Property rights are the core of ownership. We need to
improve the modern property rights system with clear ownership, clear-cut rights and
obligations, strict protection and smooth flow. The property rights of the public sector are
inviolable, as are those of the non-public sector.”).
28. See generally STEIN, supra note 1, at 170-98 (reviewing and assessing several
possible explanations).
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2008] have not taken place.”29 Carried to its extreme, this argument
could even be stretched to suggest that law and development theory
is exactly backwards in China, where there is evidence that
economic growth is a precondition to legal development.
A second and related possible explanation is that law and
development theory, while not completely inaccurate, needs to be
refined considerably. Perhaps it overstates the case. Perhaps it is
correct as far as it goes while overlooking other causes that have
contributed to Chinese economic growth. Perhaps it is more
accurate in some contexts and settings than in others. Or perhaps
informal systems have filled in many of the gaps in the formal legal
system, a point I will return to momentarily. For example, one pair
of commentators argues that China’s formal legal institutions
provide adequate security for shorter-term investments, but that
investors with longer time horizons rely more on close connections
with powerful government officials.30 And Cheryl Xiaoning Long
summarizes the literature suggesting that personal relationships
are more useful in establishing a less complex economy but that as
the economy matures, governance by legal rule becomes more
important.31
A third alternative is that China is following the law and
development theory to a greater extent than many of the
commentators have acknowledged and is gradually improving its
adherence to rule-of-law standards. My field research in China
largely supports this view. In the first days of the modern Chinese
real estate market, there was no official law governing property
rights, but other early laws were able to fill this gap. China adopted
the General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL) all the way back in
1986, and this early law served as a basic business law blueprint
during the ensuing years. Once the GPCL was in place, investors
had a higher degree of comfort that their investments were being
encouraged and safeguarded by official government policy and that
greater protections would follow in time. During the 1990s and early
2000s, China adopted other laws governing business relationships.
The Property Rights Law, effective in 2007, was actually one of the
final steps in that process. That law may have been adopted fairly

29. Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of
Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 551, 553
(2009).
30. Wei Zhang & Ji Li, Weak Law v. Strong Ties: An Empirical Study of Business
Investment, Law and Political Connections in China 23-25 (July 9, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291787.
31. Long, supra note 25, at 630, 647.
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late, but other related laws already were serving to regulate
business dealings and provide investors with the confidence they
needed that their stakes were adequately protected.32
If this third alternative is correct – and I believe that it is – then
China actually has had sufficient legal protections in place for about
thirty years. China’s government was not in a position to draft
comprehensive business laws in the early 1980s. It did not yet know
what topics it needed to address and in what sequence, it did not
have the time to undertake such a massive project quickly enough,
and it lacked familiarity with both business and law-making.
Meanwhile, the business community was beginning to expand
without waiting for the legal system to ratify its actions. The
government’s response since that time has been to draft laws as
quickly as it feasibly could. Along the way, it observed what the
business community was doing and what was working and what
was not, and endorsed some of these experiments in its everexpanding body of formal law. Legislators learned from the business
community, which then responded to the new legislation. Thus,
legal and business developments proceeded hand in hand, with each
side prodding the other to act. During this interim period, informal
norms and guanxi also served to fill in some of the gaps in the legal
system.33
This point serves as a reminder that China’s development of
an effective legal system has involved considerable transmission
of information in both directions. It is not simply the case
that business people begin by doing the best they can under
considerable legal uncertainty and then the government, acting in
isolation, adopts a legal structure unrelated to these new practices.
Rather, the government observes what is happening in practice and
is influenced by it, even as business people lobby for particular
reforms. By following this approach, the Chinese government has
been able to adhere to a development strategy that fosters economic
progress. Once a legal structure is adopted, the business and legal
communities adjust to it while also pressing for additional changes.
32. See generally Weitseng Chen, Arbitrage for Property Rights: How Foreign Investors
Create Substitutes for Property Institutions in China, 24 WASH. INT’L L.J. 47 (2015)
(discussing institutional substitutes for strong property rights on which investors relied).
33. See David Kennedy, Law and Development Economics: Toward a New Alliance, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING
DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19, 55 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz
eds. 2013) (“The focus on legal formalization downplays the role in economic life of the
informal sector – the sector governed by norms other than those enforced by the state or that
emerges in the gaps among official institutions”); Li and Li, supra note 3, at 25-27 (noting
how guanxi has served as an informal enforcement system in China but suggesting that it
needs to be supplanted by rule-of-law principles as the Chinese economy becomes more
complex and China’s citizens become more mobile).
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There is an ongoing conversation among business professionals,
lawyers, legislators, and judges, with every action leading to a
response and the system evolving over time.34 In theory, real estate
practice should become more efficient and predictable as it matures,
as appears to be happening in China. So while the law and
development model in its purest form holds that legal developments
must precede business investment, in fact, the two are more
likely to progress in tandem, with developments in each sphere
influencing the other in a type of feedback loop.35 Moreover, these
developments reflect China’s unique history and culture.36
Every step of the way, the business community had enough
comfort to act, with each subsequent legal development providing
more certainty and thereby reducing investment risk. The 2007
Property Rights Law was important, but earlier legislation had
already done much of the necessary labor. If lawmakers had had a
decade to sit down and draft a comprehensive law before the
business community acted, they might have come up with a more
coherent and systematized legal approach. But the system that
actually developed may be superior to the one that process might
have produced, in that it reflects actual experience and encourages
further experimentation.37 China has managed to develop a
sophisticated system of business law in little more than a quarter of
a century, while it took the West about two centuries to reach this
34. See van Gelder, supra note 4, at 497 (“[S]ettlements often actively attempt to
establish their ‘legality’ through strategies of noncompliance with, and adaptation to, the
official legal system in order to ultimately enforce formal recognition by the latter, which gives
rise to a dynamic and evolving relationship between the two.”); see also id. at 510 (discussing
the effects of “presenting the authorities with a fait accompli that is difficult to return to its
original form and residents in these settlements also progressively attempt[ing] to convert
the informal tenure into legal tenure through processes of negotiation, contestation and
adaptation.”).
35. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 7 (1990) (describing how organizations and institutions co-evolve in a
“feedback process”); Zhong Zhang, Law and Finance: The Case of Stock Market Development
in China 2-9 (March 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642165 (making similar points about China’s stock market).
36. See David Kennedy, Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic
Development, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 187, 192 (David Kennedy and
Joseph E. Stiglitz eds. 2013) (“Consequently, property rights are less a legal ‘system’ than a
historical record of winners, losers, and social accommodation in economic and political
struggles over a nation’s direction. . . . The ongoing allocation and definition of property
entitlements is part of the social and political history of any market economy.”).
37. For a valuable discussion of the sequencing of Chinese legal and economic
development, see Alice Xie, Revising the Law-Growth Hypothesis: A Case Study of ReformEra China, 6 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 155, 178 (2013) (“Not only can economic activity flourish
in the absence of law, but it may actually stimulate and inspire the development of the legal
system.”); id. at 157 (“China is a case in point of how alternative mechanisms to the rule of
law, and indeed wholly alternative systems, can sustain such conditions to yield spectacular
economic growth.”).
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same level of legal development. Of course, the Chinese process has
been far more harried and frenetic.
These three possible explanations are not the only ways in which
China’s recent growth can be harmonized with the traditional model
of law and development. A fourth possibility is that the law and
development model cannot be transplanted to China because of the
huge historical, cultural, and social differences between China and
the West. The nation is too big and too different, and is developing
too rapidly, for anyone in the West to expect a supposedly universal
model to apply to China.
Mo Zhang notes, for example, that “China does not regard the
rule of law as having universal application. Instead it insists that
the rule of law in a country is determined by and conforms to its
national conditions and social system.”38 Similarly, in commenting
on the large amount of control China’s government continues to
exercise over its economy, another pair of commentators notes
a growing consensus that China’s “state-investment-led, exportoriented variants work well during the catch-up phase under
favorable global conditions but do not work at higher stages of
development.”39 In fact, one pair of commentators even argues that
culture serves as a partial determinant of economic development.40
And Mary Szto describes the importance of various Chinese rituals
to the practice of law, a fact that a Western observer less familiar
with China might easily overlook.41
A fifth and related alternative is that it is foolhardy to attempt
to apply the law and development model to a nation that is still
Communist. Under this view, China’s economic system has not
changed sufficiently since the death of Mao to be a suitable subject
for examination under a Western economic model. No one disputes
that China’s economy has undergone remarkable change in recent
decades. Even so, this criticism still might apply to certain portions
of China’s real estate sector. For example, it is fair to ask whether
China’s rural land system has changed to the point where it makes

38. Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s
Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 6 (2010).
39. Randall Peerenboom & Bojan Bugaric, Development After the Global Financial
Crisis: The Emerging Post Washington, Post Beijing Consensus, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 89, 99 (2015). The authors proceed to ask whether the problem with the
Washington consensus is “an invisible hand and too little government intervention,” while
the problem in China today is “too visible a hand and too much government intervention.” Id.
at 100.
40. See Nabamita Dutta & Deepraj Mukherjee, Is Culture A Determinant of Financial
Development?, 19 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 585 (2012).
41. Mary Szto, Chinese Ritual and the Practice of Law, 30 TOURO L. REV. 103 (2014)
(discussing drinking tea, banqueting, drinking alcohol, napping, and karaoke).
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sense to attempt to apply the law and development model to it.42
One might reasonably make the same inquiry about China’s statecontrolled lending industry, discussed above.43
A sixth possibility is that each nation is unique, and no one
can expect a generalized model to apply terribly well to any
specific nation. One-size-fits-all garments do not actually fit most
people terribly well, and “developing countries cannot just imitate
international best practices.”44 This sixth possibility unifies the
previous five in many ways: China does not seem to be following
the law and development model in full but it has adopted it
to some extent, and the areas of nonconformity reflect China’s
exceptionality. Of course, this type of rationalization both confirms
and discredits the law and development model, or just about any
other model for that matter: The model fits where it fits, and no one
can expect any model to fit perfectly.45
Thus, there seem to be at least six ways to explain the
apparent disconnect between China’s recent economic growth and
the traditional model of law and development. As this part
demonstrates, that lack of conformity may be inherent in any model.
A model is not a perfect predictor of actual behavior, and China’s
departures from the model may just be what one should expect.
It does appear, though, that China has followed the law and
development model reasonably well. This statement is particularly
true once one recognizes that even before China adopted its
Property Rights Law, it had implemented other business laws that
did a fairly good job of providing the market with the requisite
predictability. China’s system was only partially developed at that
point, but it did exhibit enough of the elements of a formal legal
system to give comfort to real estate investors. They were not simply
investing and hoping for the best. Rather, they knew what these
other laws said, they had a good sense of how these rules were being
42. Note, for example, that many of the buildings in formerly rural Shenzhen are built
on land to which the purported owners have only questionable legal title. See Shitong Qiao,
Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market Without Legal Titles, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC.
253, 258 (2014) (noting that “the need for economic development in Shenzhen could not wait
for definitive legal authorization of rural land development and transactions from the Chinese
central government”).
43. Benjamin Liebman suggests that China has pulled back from its move toward the
rule of law in response to social protest. Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Reform: China’s LawStability Paradox, 143 DAEDALUS 96, 97 (2014) (suggesting that recent events demonstrate
“a retreat not only from legal reform but also from the rule-based model of authoritarian
governance that has contributed much to the resilience of the Chinese system”).
44. Peerenboom & Bugaric, supra note 39, at 101.
45. See, e.g., David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 9 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds. 2013) (“In every
market economy, each [property law and contract law] is a complex legal regime reflecting a
history of social, political, and economic conflict and debate.”).
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enforced, and they knew what existing social norms and customs
permitted and prohibited. The Property Rights Law may have
solidified this system still further, but the structure was largely in
place well before 2007. This means that, to a considerable degree,
China has been following the law and development model fairly well
since the mid-1980s.
V. CONCLUSION
Real estate professionals in China continue to face many of the
same uncertainties they have confronted for years. But these
professionals seem confident that the Chinese legal system provides
adequate legal assurances to protect their assets, a fact which
encourages further investment in this rapidly growing market.
China now has a comprehensive Property Rights Law, but investors
felt a high degree of comfort under pre-existing business laws even
before China adopted that law in 2007. In fact, the legal and
business systems in China have developed in tandem, with each one
examining, reflecting, and learning from the other. The government
views the burgeoning real estate market as a series of experiments,
and it observes the successful efforts and drafts new laws
accordingly. Investors adapt to those laws even as they seek to
influence future legal developments. Moreover, given the high level
of government involvement in the so-called private market, it would
be naïve to treat the government and the investment community
as two distinct groups. The government may be adopting laws
that protect the very investments that the government itself or
individual government officials have made in the real estate
market.
Recent Chinese business practices may have developed in ways
that appear to contradict business laws, or may have arisen in the
absence of those laws. But real estate professionals have astutely
experimented, learned from their mistakes, and influenced future
legal growth. The Chinese system appears to provide a high – and
continually increasing – level of predictability and comfort to
investors. As a result, China truly does appear to be following the
traditional model of law and economic development.
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